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A B S T R A C T   
The risk of newly emerging diseases is constantly present in a world where changes occur significantly in cli-
matic, commercial, and ecological conditions, in addition to the development of biomedical investigations in new 
situations. An epidemic respiratory disease instigated by a new coronavirus was initially identified in and has 
resulted in the current global dissemination. This viral strain and its related disease has been termed “SARS-CoV- 
2” and “coronavirus disease 2019” (abbreviated “COVID-19” or “2019-nCoV”), respectively, which is transmitted 
simply between individuals. The World Health Organization (WHO) announced the COVID-19 outburst as a 
pandemic on March 11, which necessitates a cooperative endeavour globally for mitigating the spread of COVID- 
19. 
The absence of previous, and minimum present-day information, particularly concerning the path of contagion 
have precluded the control of this disease. The present article, therefore, describes the SARS-CoV-2 paths of 
contagion such as drinking water, solid waste, sewer water, ambient air, and the rest of emerging likely paths.   
1. Introduction 
As classified by the International Committee for Taxonomy of Vi-
ruses (ICTV), coronaviruses (CoV) are a member of the genus Coronavirus 
in the Coronaviridae family (Gorbalenya et al., 2020). Pleomorphism is 
seen in the RNA of all CoVs viral strains, characterized by having 
crown-shaped peplomers 80–160 nm in size (Fehr et al., 2017; Fehr and 
Perlman, 2015; Sahin et al., 2020). The viruses have a positive-sense, 
single-stranded ribonucleic acid (RNA) genome with a length in the 
range of 26–32 kilobases (kb) hence containing the biggest RNA of viral 
genome (Ahmad and Rodriguez-Morales, 2020; Fehr et al., 2017; Roosa 
et al., 2020). Recombination of CoVs occur at intensely high rates since 
there are constant development of transcription errors and RNA-related 
RNA polymerase (RdRP) vaults (Sahin et al., 2020). Such a high muta-
tion rate renders coronaviruses zoonotic pathogens found in humans and 
a variety of animals with a wide-ranging clinical properties, from an 
symptomless period to the need for hospital care in the intensive care 
unit, which causes infections in the respiratory, gastrointestinal, he-
patic, and neurologic systems (Desforges et al., 2019; Fehr et al., 2017; 
Roosa et al., 2020; Rothan and Byrareddy, 2020). The viruses are 
sometimes capable of causing more severe disease in young, elderly, or 
immunocompromised people (Rothan and Byrareddy, 2020; Tang et al., 
2020). These viral strains are subdivided into four major subclasses of 
alpha, beta, gamma, and delta. Alpha and beta coronaviruses have their 
mammalian (bats) origins, whereas gamma and delta coronaviruses are 
of swine and avian origins (Burrell et al., 2017; Tao et al., 2017; Wang 
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et al., 2019). In humans, infection is caused by seven coronaviruses, 
namely HCoV-229E (alpha coronavirus), HCoV-NL63 (alpha coronavirus), 
HCoV-OC43 (beta coronavirus), HCoV-HKU1 (beta coronavirus), Middle 
East Respiratory Syndrome, or MERS-CoV (beta coronavirus), Severe 
Acute Respiratory Syndrome, or SARS-CoV (beta coronavirus) (Burrell 
et al., 2017), and the Novel Coronavirus (2019-nCoV) detected recently 
in 2019 (Ahmad et al., 2020; Lippi et al., 2020), known as SARS-CoV-2, 
which causes the Coronavirus Virus Disease of 2019 (COVID-19). Four of 
seven common human CoVs (HCoVs) result in common self-limited 
upper respiratory diseases: HCoV-229E, HCoV-OC43, HCoV-NL63, and 
HCoV-HKU1 (Chang et al., 2020). Of more than 60 coronaviruses (CoVs) 
isolates obtained from bats (BtCoV), the majority belong to the genus 
betacoronavirus. Bats function as huge (and very movable) CoV sources; 
most of bat species possess their specific exclusive BtCoV, which suggests 
that they have coevolved over a highly prolonged history (Payne, 2017). 
In humans, coronaviruses fall into the range of viruses causing the 
common cold and also more serious respiratory diseases, specially, se-
vere acute respiratory syndrome (SARS, 2002) and the Middle East 
respiratory syndrome (MERS, 2014), both of which are zoonotic diseases 
initially detected by the culture of viruses from patients with common 
colds in the mid-1960s (Li et al., 2019; Lu et al., 2020). 
1.1. The host of SARS-CoV-2 
As suggested by evolutionary assays by the use of ORF1a/1b, S, and 
N genes, SARS-CoV-2 is probably a new coronavirus with independent 
transfer from animals to humans (Chen et al., 2020a; Lai et al., 2020). A 
close identity was established between SARS-CoV-2 and two bat--
SARS-like CoV (bat-SL-CoV ZC45 and bat-SL-CoV ZXC21), particularly 
the sequence identities of the E gene in bat-SL-CoV ZC45 (GenBank 
accession no. MG772933.1), bat-SL-CoVZXC21 (GenBank accession no. 
MG772934.1) existed 98.7% among 13 gene sites, but it was more apart 
from SARS-CoV (~79% similarity) and Middle East respiratory syn-
drome coronavirus (MERS-CoV) (~50% resemblance)(Jiang et al., 
2020; Lu et al., 2020; Ren et al., 2020). An analysis of data obtained from 
the initial outburst using a full-length genome study revealed that the 
SARS-CoV-2 sequence had a 79.5% sequence identity in common with 
SARS-CoV (Zhou et al., 2020). Sequence and phylogenetic analyses 
illustrated that SARS-CoV-2 had a longer spike protein, a dissimilar 
relative phylogeny of the complete RNA-reliant RNA polymerase gene, 
and a differing apparent genetic distance (Ahmed et al., 2020; Zhou 
et al., 2020), indicating that SARS-CoV-2 is a novel betacoronavirus, not 
the SARS-CoV (Ahmed et al., 2020). Nevertheless, SARS-CoV-2 and 
SARS have a common ancestor to the bat HKU9-1 coronavirus (Xu et al., 
2020c). In Wuhan, SARS-CoV-2 is a member of the genera beta corona-
virus and genome analysis indicates that SARS-CoV-2 has closer relations 
to bat-SARS-like (SL)-ZC45 and bat- SL-ZXC21 (Zhou et al., 2020). Even 
so, the dissimilarities are also possibly suggestive of additional inter-
mediate hosts present between bats and humans. An investigational 
group observed that 70% of pangolins possessed β-CoV. A coronavirus 
isolate obtained from the pangolins contained a genome with a high 
similarity to that from SARS-CoV-2, and a genome sequence resem-
blance of 99% indicates that pangolin is likely the intermediate host of 
SARS-CoV-2 (Peng et al., 2020b). 
1.2. Diseases caused by coronaviruses 
Among the seven subtypes of coronaviruses capable of infecting 
humans, beta-coronaviruses can possibly induce serious disease and 
mortalities. The initial isolates of coronaviruses were obtained from fowls 
with respiratory disease (infective bronchitis) in the 1930s (Burrell 
et al., 2017). Until 2002, human coronaviruses (HCoVs) were linked only 
to mild respiratory tract disease, which were estimated to cause 15 %– 
25% of the entire common colds (Geller et al., 2012). This underwent a 
change in 2002 upon identification of a human coronavirus as the caus-
ative agent of an emerging disease named SARS. The SARS spread was 
taken under control, but a different new CoV isolate was collected from 
patients admitted to hospitals with severe respiratory disease in Saudi 
Arabia during 2014 (Fehr et al., 2017; Roosa et al., 2020; Zumla and 
Hui, 2014). Since the majority of affected patients were the inhabitants 
or travellers to Middle East countries, the newly detected disease was 
termed MERS and the causative coronavirus was named HCoV-MERS 
(Zumla and Hui, 2014). The transmission of most animal and human 
CoVs occurs via the faecal-oral path, and their primary proliferation 
place is in epithelial cells, in which virus reproduction induces local 
respiratory symptoms or diarrhoea (Burrell et al., 2017). Yet, CoVs is 
capable of causing acute to lethal disease. Besides seasonal flu, the 
recounted pathogens of pneumonia consist of adenovirus, coronavirus 
229E/NL63/OC43, human bocavirus, human metapneumovirus, para-
influenza virus 1/2/3, rhinovirus, and respiratory syncytial virus A/B (Chou 
et al., 2019; Lee et al., 2019a, 2019b; Su et al., 2019). Additionally, these 
viruses are able to induce co-infection in the situation of public-derived 
bacterial pneumonia (Lai et al., 2020). 
1.3. The transmission routes 
Due to the relationship of the SARS-CoV-2 to the genus betacor-
onavirus, the diseases and transmission paths for the genus are depicted 
in Fig. 1. 
The usual spread paths of the novel coronavirus are spreading 
directly (cough, sneeze, and droplet inhalation transmission) and con-
tact transmission (contact with oral, nasal, and eye mucous membranes) 
(Otter et al., 2016; Peng et al., 2020b; Tellier et al., 2019). Eye contact 
can likely pave the ground effectively for the viral entry into the body 
(Peng et al., 2020a, 2020b; To et al., 2020). Despite an insignificant risk 
of contract with SARS-CoV-2 from the faeces of a patient, there are 
proofs indicating that SARS-CoV-2 is likely to result in enteric contagion 
and be found in faeces (Gu et al., 2020). About 2–10% of patients with 
established COVID-19 manifested with diarrhoea two reports indicated 
that SARS-CoV-2 viral RNA segments were detected in the stool of 
COVID-19 patients (Chen et al., 2020b; Huang et al., 2020; Wang et al., 
2019, 2020a). Up to now, there is only one report on the culture of 
SARS-CoV-2 from a single stool sample (Holshue et al., 2020). In-
vestigations observing viral nucleic acids in these patients, additional 
studies are required to discover the existence of viral elements and 
nucleic acid levels for demonstrating faecal-oral contagion (Xiao et al., 
2020). Moreover, research has demonstrated that respiratory viruses are 
transmittable among individuals via contacting directly or indirectly, or 
coarse or small droplets, and SARS-CoV-2 is transmittable through direct 
or indirect salivary route (To et al., 2020). To be precise, aerosols denote 
particles suspending in a gas (Tellier et al., 2019). As shown by a study in 
2010, the likelihood of transmitting influenza by aerosols could be 
reduced by improving ventilation design and prevention of generating 
aerosols (Wong et al., 2010). It is usually believed that transmitting by 
aerosols is plausible due to the high risk of cross-infection among phy-
sicians, nurses, and personnel (Hoseinzadeh et al., 2013, 2014, 2017). 
Research suggests that SARS-CoV-2 is probably air-transmitted via 
aerosols produce during therapeutic actions (Huang et al., 2020; van 
Doremalen et al., 2020; Wax and Christian, 2020). Remarkably, a case of 
2019-nCoV infection reported in Germany reveals that SARS-CoV-2 may 
also transmitted via contacting with symptomless patients (Rothe et al., 
2020). Even so, transmissions through aerosol and faecal-oral routes are 
those making people concerned, necessitating to be confirmed with 
additional studies. Fomite transmission, i.e. viral dissemination via a 
material, including a door handgrip, door-bell, or inhalator, also has a 
critical contribution to the virus spread (Kraay et al., 2018; WHO, 2020). 
Additionally, postnatal infection with SARS-CoV-2-borne pneumonia in 
neonates could be boosted by the contact levels of faecal infection, 
aerosol transmission, and contacting closely with the mother (Meng 
et al., 2020). Up to now, no investigations are available reporting 
COVID-19 transmission via exposure to blood (Zhou et al., 2020). 
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2. Environmental transmission possibility 
Besides public movement and person-to-person connections, viral 
contagion and survivability can be impacted by environmental players 
(e.g., influenza), but no research has yet studied the topic about this new 
pathogen. Absolute humidity, described as the water content in ambient 
air, is a robust determining factor in the environment for other viral 
spreads (Hoseinzadeh et al., 2017; Wolkoff, 2018; Yang and Marr, 
2012). For instance, influenza viruses live lengthier on surfaces or in 
droplets in cold and dry air, which increases the possibility of succeeding 
contagion. It is, therefore, imperative to apprehend the impacts of 
environmental elements on the progressive outburst to endorse making 
decisions on controlling the disease, particularly in places in which there 
is a likely underestimation of the transmission risk, including in moist 
and warmer areas. This paper focuses on drinking water, sewage sys-
tems, solid waste, and ambient air as potential paths of contagion in the 
environment. 
2.1. Transmission by drinking water 
As a tiny infective agent, a virus proliferates only within the organ-
ismal living cells but not within contaminated cells, or in the event of 
contaminating cells. Viruses are found independently in the form of 
particles. Waterborne viruses are different with regard to their genome 
contents and capsid proteins, but such viruses have some common at-
tributes making them of specific interest concerning the risk of disease 
endemics related to drinking water infections (Gall et al., 2015). 
Water-spread viral pathogens, categorized in terms of moderate to high 
health importance by the WHO, consist of adenovirus, astrovirus, hepatitis 
A and E viruses, rotavirus, norovirus, and other caliciviruses, as well as 
enteroviruses including coxsackieviruses and polioviruses (Gall et al., 
2015). Also, viruses of urine urinary excretion (e.g. polyomaviruses and 
cytomegalovirus) have the potential to be disseminated via water (Gall 
et al., 2015; Goetsch et al., 2018; WHO, 2011). Other viruses (e.g. 
influenza and coronaviruses) have been considered as organisms being 
transmittable via drinking water, but there is indecisive evidence (Gall 
et al., 2015; WHO, 2011). Besides, the COVID-19 virus has not been 
shown to be present in drinking water sources, and existing documen-
tation indicate a low risk to water sources (WHO, 2020). Extreme 
numbers of viruses are excreted in fecal matter even in a symptomless 
manner. For instance, up to 1011 norovirus particles are detectable per 
gram of faeces (Gall et al., 2015). Additionally, non-enfold viruses can 
survive in water for prolonged time-periods (Firquet et al., 2015; Pinon 
and Vialette, 2018). With taking account of these features, insufficient 
sanitization of faecal-infected drinking water facilitates endemics of 
viral gastroenteritis from consumption. Remarkably, drinking water is 
also capable of transmitting viruses through inhalation or aspiration (e. 
g., water-bathing) or contacting with skin and eyes (e.g., swimming), 
which cause respiratory and ophthalmic contaminations (Pinon and 
Vialette, 2018). COVID-19 virus is an encased virus with a brittle exte-
rior membrane. Encased viruses have in general less environmental 
stability with more susceptibility to such oxidants as chlorine (Pinon and 
Vialette, 2018). Although no documentation is available hitherto on the 
COVID-19 virus survivability in water or sewerage (WHO, 2020), the 
virus can probably be deactivated considerably quicker than 
non-encased human intestinal viruses (e.g., adenovirus, norovirus, rota-
virus, and hepatitis A) with confirmed transmission ability through water. 
Heller et al. by considering the detection of SARS-CoV-2 in stools and 
sewage, proposed the faecal-oral transmission of COVID-19 from envi-
ronment to human(Heller et al., 2020). According to other concordant 
investigations, the human coronavirus illustrated a 99.9% die-out from 2 
days to 2 weeks at 23 �C and 25 �C, respectively, (WHO, 2020). The 
die-out is facilitated by heat, high or low pH, sunshine, and commonly 
used sanitizers (e.g., chlorine) (Pinon and Vialette, 2018). 
2.1.1. Water treatment process against viruses 
Commonly used water purification methods globally are physical 
removal of pathogenic agents by treating conventionally and inactiva-
tion of pathogenic agents via application of ultraviolet light or chemical 
oxidizing agents including chlorine, chloramines, ozone, and chlorine 
dioxide. Due to the tiny size of viruses (mostly with a diameter ranging 
between 5 and 400 nm), though some paramyxoviruses may be up to 
14,000 nm long, traditional purification, including filtration (Fig. 2), is 
not effective in physical removal of viruses. 
Fujioka et al. reported bacterial removal rates of 95⋅2 %-99⋅3% 
during full-scale water filtering (Fujioka et al., 2019). Thus, viral re-
movals are not expectedly lower than bacterial ones (>0.2 μm in size) 
due to the size. The use of sanitizers is greatly dependent upon water 
Fig. 1. Betacoronavirus diseases and transmission paths (the routes for COVID-19 under study and not yet confirmed) (Burrell et al., 2017; MacLachlan and Dubovi, 
2017) for betacronovirus except SARS-CoV-2. 
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chemistry and regional rules. Free chlorine (i.e., the sum of hypochlo-
rous acid and hypochlorite ions produced by dissolving and hydrolysing 
chlorine gas in water) is the disinfection agent with the uppermost usage 
around the world (Hoseinzadeh, 2019). This powerful oxidizing agent 
inactivates the majority of viruses (Pinon and Vialette, 2018). None-
theless, treat with free chlorine may form regularized toxic disinfection 
by-products (DBPs). Adenovirus has susceptibility to deactivation with 
free chlorine with high resistance to deactivation using both mono-
chloramine and UV light (Pinon and Vialette, 2018). Chlorine dioxide 
and ozone are also robust oxidizing agents, both of which can effectively 
control viruses (Gall et al., 2015). Irrespective of the sanitization utilized 
at a drinking water facility, the travel of purified water from the treat-
ment plant to the tap can lead to cross-contamination all over the extent 
of water dissemination substructure because of cavitation and random 
depressurisation; thus, it is necessary to utilize alternative sanitizers in 
distribution systems. Free chlorine and monochloramine are the only 
two sanitizers that can maintain remains in the distribution system. In 
spite of more powerful disinfecting effect of free chlorine in terms of 
inactivating pathogens, monochloramine leaves residues with a higher 
stability in distribution systems hence both are useable. Human coro-
navirus can persist for only two days in dechlorinated tap water and 
hospital effluent at 20 �C (WHO, 2020). A main barricade to extensive 
use of water quality settings is that not a single sanitization technique is 
effectual towards the whole viruses. To have efficient concentrated 
sanitization, free chlorine remaining concentration must be � 0⋅5 mg/L 
following a minimum of 30 min after contact time at pH < 8⋅0 (WHO, 
2011). A chlorine residue should remain all over the distribution system. 
2.1.2. Detection of viruses in drinking water 
Water purification facilities routinely examine the existence of faecal 
coliforms in water sources, but they do not examine the existence of 
infective viruses due to either impossibility or unfeasibility of detecting 
or propagating infective viral particles cost-effectively and in a well- 
timed fashion. Whereas, viral proteins or genomes can be detected 
swiftly utilizing enzyme-linked immunosorbent assay (ELISA) or quan-
titative polymerase chain reaction (qPCR)-based technologies, respec-
tively, the techniques cannot discriminate between infective and non- 
infective viral particles. Integrated cell culture-PCR (ICC-PCR) lowers 
the time demands of conventional plaque tests allowing infective viruses 
to proliferate in host cells, but a cell culture used in the technique is not 
even practical at water treatment facilities (Gall et al., 2015). Despite 
advancements obtained in collecting viruses from huge volumes of 
water, it remains as a fast way of detecting survivable viruses. Multiple 
existing barricades preclude detection of viruses in drinking water. To 
consider technologically, viral replication needs using tissue culture, a 
system requiring elevated time, workforce, skill, and costly apparatus. 
Additionally, some of these viruses are not culturable simply (adenovirus 
serotypes 40 and 41) or at all (human norovirus, hepatitis A virus) in 
culture media. Accordingly, conventional viral development tests 
(plaque assays) are either inaccessible or highly time-taking rendering 
them impractical for water treatment facilities. Generally, the potential 
of SARS-CoV-2 transmission via water sources is low(Cahill and Morris, 
2020) but more research need to study the viability of the virus and 
contamination of water source that can transmit the SARS-CoV-2 to 
humans. 
2.2. Transmission by sewerage systems 
The majority of faecal-oral-spread viruses have high resistance in the 
water milieu, in which they are likely to present improved survival in 
spite of the sanitization procedures usually utilized to treat drinking 
water and sewerage (Hoseinzadeh, 2019). The bulk of such viruses are 
non-encased viruses, such as norovirus, enterovirus, Aichi virus, par-
echovirus, hepatitis A and E viruses (HAV and HEV, respectively), astro-
virus, rotavirus, and adenovirus (Ad) (Gall et al., 2015). These viruses are 
detectable in effluents as people excrete about 100g of stool daily, and 
105- 109 intestinal viral particles per gram of stool are released every day 
from a diseased person (Wigginton et al., 2012). Since 107-1013 viral 
particles are excreted daily from an diseased person (Wigginton et al., 
2012), a possibly helpful tool is to analyse entering effluent to disclose 
the existence and quantification of defecated human pathogenic agents, 
thereby providing an estimate of the numbers of diseased individuals(La 
Rosa et al., 2020). If the virus is present, it will not indicate a relation 
between the viral sequences in effluent and those from patients of the 
same sampling time and area (Hellm�er et al., 2014). Multiple virus 
recognition methods were designed for detecting poliovirus in effluent in 
accordance to the WHO polio removal program (Matrajt et al., 2018). 
Seven weekly combined untreated effluent samples from Ryaverket (a 
large wastewater treatment plant in Gothenburg) were analysed to 
determine the existence of seven differing intestinal viruses: norovirus, 
astrovirus, rotavirus, adenovirus, Aichi virus, hepatitis A virus, and hepatitis 
E virus (Hellm�er et al., 2014). The virus is detectable prior to occurring 
an endemic, as reported by a research on norovirus, because the virus 
may be defecated in stool prior to the incidence of indications (Carter, 
2005), which is 1–2 days for norovirus GII and 4–5 days for astrovirus(Lee 
et al., 2013) whereas, the defecation duration is lengthier for hepatitis A 
and E viruses, occurring for about 7 weeks (Richardson et al., 2001). No 
documentation is available hitherto about the COVID-19 virus trans-
mission through sewer systems, with or without wastewater treatment. 
Besides, no proof can be found regarding the counteraction with SARS 
by effluent and wastewater treatment staffs. Genetically compared 
effluent viruses with those from clinical periodic cases and endemics can 
put forward a model to understand the epidemiology of intestinal viral 
pathogens in the population. Thus, surveillance of effluent regularly for 
such viruses can offer an ahead-of-time alarm of a potential forthcoming 
outbreaks. The encumbrance of contagion in a special population can 
also be estimated by the use of typing as an instrument. Based on a 
research work in Helsinki, Finland, poliovirus was detectable in effluent 
Fig. 2. Schematic flow diagram of a drinking water treatment plant.  
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if only 1 in 10,000 residents defecated the virus (Hovi et al., 2001). Even 
so, it may identify genomes from non-infective viral particles as well 
(Hellm�er et al., 2014). A study conducted in Spain on six wastewater 
treatment plants in an area with lowest COVID-19 prevalence revealed 
that two secondary water sample were polluted. Comparison of the data 
with data of confirmed COVID-19 cases at municipally level revealed 
that people were shedding SARS-CoV-2 RNA in their faeces even before 
the first cases were reported by local or national authorities (Randazzo 
et al., 2020). In case of identifying only viral segments, it will continue 
providing an acceptable denotation about the types of viruses circu-
lating in the community and those infecting individuals not seeking 
therapeutic care. It is recommendable to utilize this procedure for 
forecasting COVID-19 in the public(Randazzo et al., 2020). As a fraction 
of a merged population health strategy, effluent passed through sewer 
systems should undergo ideal treatment in decently established and 
properly controlled consolidated wastewater treatment utilities. Finally, 
it is possible to consider a decontamination phase if available sewer 
water purification plants are not subjected to optimisation to for viral 
removal. It is essential to follow the best applications to protect the 
professional health of labours at sanitization treatment installations. 
Labours need to put on suitable personal protective equipment (PPE), 
including protecting outer wear, gloves, boots, goggles, or face shields, 
masks, regularly hand hygiene, and avoiding the touch of the eyes, nose, 
and mouth with dirty hands. 
2.3. Transmission by healthcare waste 
Leftovers created during health care activities possess great poten-
tiality for contamination, and its insufficient managing practices exposes 
health care personnel (e.g., physicians, nurses, and laboratory staffs), 
waste carriers, and patients in hospitals to health risks both directly and 
indirectly (Amsalu et al., 2016). Health-care waste (HCW) carries a vast 
array of pathogenic agents. Professional risk associated with COVID-19 
contact is a main concerning issue, particularly in developing countries 
in which people do not rigorously follow a protocol for waste treatment. 
Documentations are absent about human exposure directly and inse-
curely throughout treatment of HCW resulting in the COVID-19 
endemic. A report by the WHO (2004) indicate that urban and solid 
HCW have identical contents of microorganisms, and that 2% of 
blood-stained waste tested positively for hepatitis viruses, poliovirus, and 
echovirus identified in the defiled diapers of household waste(WHO, 
2004). Pathogenic viruses, such as NoVs and hepatitis B virus, have been 
identified in human tissue waste (WHO, 2004)(WHO, 2004). There is 
little information suggesting that viral RNA was detectable in the 
plasmas or sera of COVID-19 infected people (Chang et al., 2020). Even 
so, observations of researches conducted experimentally demonstrated 
that some viruses (e.g. respiratory syncytial virus) have partial surviv-
ability under settings possibly found in a variety of wastes (Park et al., 
2009), and that viral loads are usually low. Thus, an essential issue is 
that labours follow group and personal protecting procedures including 
gloves, respiratory masks, glasses, and overalls that are previously 
supplied in all working environment security plans (Carducci et al., 
2013). Since minor amounts of information are available from individ-
ual plants, it is necessary to perform more inclusive surveillance ex-
aminations. All HCW created throughout the care of COVID-19 patients 
need to be gathered securely in engineered vessels and bags, handled, 
and then carefully discarded and/or treated, preferably in situ (WHO, 
2020). In case of moving wastes ex situ, its treatment and destruction 
place and mechanism must be understood critically. Prior to treatment 
of HCW, it is necessary to wear suitable PPE (boots, apron, long-sleeved 
gown, thick gloves, mask, and goggles), and perform appropriate hand 
sanitation after elimination. To gain more data, the reader is referred to 
the WHO Safe Management of Wastes from Health-Care Activities 
guidance(WHO, 2014). An emphasis is placed on necessary trainings in 
preventing contagion, in particular concerning waste treatment and 
removal. It is imperative to follow the most acceptable operations to 
safely manage HCW, such as assignment of accountability and providing 
adequate human and material resources for safe removal of waste. 
2.4. Transmission by inanimate surfaces 
Non-encased viruses (e.g. coxsackieviruses, rotavirus, or poliovirus) 
can be viable for prolonged times on surfaces whereas, encased viruses, 
such as H1N1 and human coronaviruses, are still infective on surfaces 
after few days. A variety of environmental situations and parameters 
including heat, moisture, pH, and surface type influence the viability of 
desiccated viruses (Firquet et al., 2015). The ingredients of the media 
can affect the viability of viruses as well. Environmental surfaces 
probably contribute to the spread of hospital-derived viral contamina-
tions (Ryu et al., 2020; Wang et al., 2020b; Ye et al., 2020). At times of 
endemics in health care services, samples taken from surfaces discov-
ered SARS-CoV nucleic acids on surfaces and non-living substances 
(Casanova et al., 2010), suggesting that surfaces could be sources of 
virus spread for SARS-CoV-2. Environmental viral tests identify them in 
protein-laden media (such as serum) and protein-poor media, including 
water. Hydrophobic substances prevent the spread of droplets, and their 
non-porous feature improves viral survivability (Firquet et al., 2015). 
Survival duration of the COVID-19 causing virus on surfaces is not 
certainly known, but it apparently behaves the same as other coronavi-
ruses. Recently, reviewing the viability of human coronaviruses on sur-
faces revealed high survivability, in the range of 2 h–9 days(WHO, 
2020). Casanova et al. (2010) demonstrated that infective SARS-CoV 
survived for a period of 28 days at 4 �C, and the deactivation was 
lowermost at 20% relative humidity (RH). Faster deactivation occurred 
at 20 �C than at 4 �C at all moisture levels; the viruses were viable for 
5–28 days, and a low RH led to the slowest deactivation. Deactivation of 
viruses was more rapid at 40 �C than at 20 �C (Casanova et al., 2010). 
The association between deactivation and RH was not monotone, and 
low RH (20%) and high RH (80%) resulted in better persistence or a 
higher protecting impact than at mild RH (50%) (Casanova et al., 2010). 
Deactivation is dividable into two steps of initial represented by water 
loss because of evaporating free water from the surface (Zhao et al., 
2012), exposing viruses to a liquid-air interface, which leads to viral 
deactivation. The discrepancy can be attributed to rehydration, notice-
ably inactivating non-lipid viruses, including poliovirus (Zhao et al., 
2012). Even so, iterative drying cannot influence non-encased viruses. 
Encased viruses showed more sensitivity than non-encased ones in the 
second stage of viral survival, which began once the liquid could not be 
seen on the lids anymore. Probably, the viruses survived for days or even 
weeks on dry hydrophobic surfaces (Firquet et al., 2015; WHO, 2011). 
Media constituents and component contents had a clear contribution 
upon exposure of virus suspensions to desiccation (Firquet et al., 2015; 
WHO, 2011). Coronaviruses are encased, positive-sense, and 
single-stranded RNA viruses. They typically show vulnerability to 
acid-pH, basic-pH, and heat, but apparently have more stability at 4 �C. 
The lipid bilayer casing of these viruses has rather sensitivity to dryness, 
heat, and detersives; thus, their sterilisation is simpler than non-encased 
viruses (Firquet et al., 2015; WHO, 2011). Several studies report that a 
succeeding elevation in solute concentrations in droplets could modu-
late the survivability of viruses against desiccation. Because the contents 
of media has a contribution the survivability of viruses subjected to 
desiccation, further investigations are necessary on the viral viability in 
natural media (clinical or environmental), rather than determined 
media. Contamination of surfaces in hospital was investigated by et al. 
(Razzini et al., 2020)which reported that 35% of COVID-19 patient’s 
ward, 50% undressing room and no clean areas were contaminated with 
COVID-19. The most contaminated surfaces were hand sanitizer dis-
pensers, medical equipment, medical equipment touch screens, and 
shelves for medical equipment, bedrails and door handles, respectively. 
Kampf et al. presented evidence that efficient inactivation of coronavi-
ruses would be possible by surface sanitizers containing 62%-71% 
ethanol, 0⋅5% hydrogen peroxide, or 0⋅1% sodium hypochlorite for 
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approx. 1 min, but other biocides, e.g. 0⋅05%-0⋅2% benzalkonium 
chloride or 0⋅02% chlorhexidine digluconate, presented lower effec-
tiveness (Kampf et al., 2020). 
2.5. Transmission by ambient air 
Various pathogens c are present in the air and have the potential to 
be spread over extended spaces (Hoseinzadeh et al., 2017), which 
comprise influenza virus, SARS virus, Mycobacterium tuberculosis, foot and 
mouth disease, and several other ones. The majority of patients with 
COVID-19 were affected severely by acute respiratory infection, 
including fever, cough, and shortness of breath, leading to death of most 
of such people. Given that respiratory spread and the spread of surviv-
able virus placed on the surfaces is possible, the viability of 
air-transmitted viral aerosolised should be importantly investigated in 
ambient air(Morawska and Cao, 2020). Felipe Falc~aoSobral et al. found 
the negative association between air temperature and COVID-19 cases. 
In addition, they found rainfall as an important climate factor in SAR-
S-CoV-2 transmission(Sobral et al., 2020). Furthermore, the impact of 
weather on COVID-19 pandemic in Turkey assessed by Mehmet Şahin. 
He found inverse correlation between wind speed, air humidity and 
temperature as the weather parameters with COVID-19 cases(Şahin, 
2020). The similar results obtained by Wu et al. (2020); Yao et al. (2020) 
as well. A study(Xu et al., 2020a) showed a significant relation (Poisson 
regression model) between air quality index (AQI) that determine the 
ambient air quality with COVID-19 cases for Chinese cities. A recent 
extensive research has studied the persistence of diverse strains of 
air-conveyed influenza virus and (Pyankov et al., 2012) observed that 
infectious virus were present following 90 min of aerosolisation. Air 
temperature and humidity, microbial resistance to external physical and 
biological stresses, and solar intensity have been introduced to be some 
significant factors of air that affect the persistence and distribution of 
microorganisms (Pyankov et al., 2012). Cases may be transmitted 
continually and grow (exponentially) and rapidly within an spectrum of 
humidity varying from cold and dry provinces in China, including Jilin 
and Heilongjiang, to hot regions, such as Guangxi, and Singapore (Luo 
et al., 2020). A conclusion can be drawn that climatic changes lonely (i. 
e., rises of temperature and humidity upon reaching spring and summer 
months in the Northern Hemisphere) will not essentially result in re-
ductions in case frequencies with no execution of widespread public 
health interventions. Carducci et al. (2013) reported that totally 30% 
(12/40) of air samples and 13⋅5% (5/37) of surface samples obtained 
from the solid waste removal location were positive for the virus. 
Pyankov et al. (2018) investigated the persistence of aerosolised MER-
S-CoV in ambient air. They detected a rather high count of viral particles 
at 25 �C, as opposed to influenza strains, with over 63% of living par-
ticles staying in the air following 60 min of aerosolisation. The inacti-
vation was much more effectual at 38 �C, with merely 4⋅7% live viruses 
observed after completing the 60 min run. The reported findings illus-
trate that the strain is capable of surviving during prolonged times and 
has the potential of spreading because of respiratory contagion even 
under tropical and arid weather situations relating to the Middle Eastern 
area, the place of origin for this virus. Doremalen et al. found identical 
persistence of HCoV-19 and SARS-CoV under the settings examined 
experimentally (van Doremalen et al., 2020). According to their find-
ings, HCoV-19 retained its viability in aerosols in the course of their 
experimental period (3 h) with a reduced in infective titre between 103.5 
and 102.7 TCID50/L, to the same as that noticed for SARS-CoV, from 104.3 
to 103.5 TCID50/mL. The above surveys suggest that aerosol and fomite 
spread of HCoV-19 is probable because the virus is able to retain its 
viability in aerosols for several hours and on surfaces for a number of 
days. Ogen studied the nitrogen dioxide (NO2) levels of ambient air as a 
causal factor to coronavirus (COVID-19) fatality in Turkey. The results 
showed as the NO2 can lead to lung inflammatory and may be increasing 
susceptibility to air pollution, so chronic airway disease due to long-term 
exposure to air pollutants can increase the COVID-19 fatality(Ogen, 
2020). In regard with impact of particulate matter, Mehmood et al. 
stated that although the short- and long-term exposure with PM2.5 
resulted in higher incidence of lethality of COVID-19, however, esti-
mation of PM2.5 incidence is required to experimental and epidemio-
logical studies(Mehmood et al., 2020). Correia et al. addressed indoor 
and environmental transmission of the SARS-CoV-2 through Heating, 
Ventilation and Air Conditioning Systems (HVAC)(Correia et al., 2020). 
By controlling this transmission routs the pandemic control of COVID-19 
can be more effective. However, Faridi et al. (2020)did not found viral 
RNA in air samples taken from patient room with confirmed COVID-19 
at distance of 2–5 m from the beds. 
3. New ways of SARS-CoV-2 transmission that maybe facilitated 
by angiotensin-converting enzyme 2 (ACE2) 
The commonly observed indications of COVID-19 at disease inci-
dence are fever, fatigue, dry cough, myalgia, and dyspnoea (Wang et al., 
2020a). Few patients could also present headache, dizziness, abdominal 
pain, diarrhoea, nausea, and vomiting (Wang et al., 2020a). Illness 
incidence may result in continuous respiratory inability because of 
alveolar harm and even demise. The expression and dissemination of 
angiotensin-converting enzyme 2 (ACE2) in the human body can be 
indicative of the possible entrance of SARS-CoV-2 that play as a receptor 
(Bosso et al., 2020). High ACE2 expression was detected in type II 
alveolar cells (AT2) of the lung, oesophagus, upper and stratified 
epithelial cells, absorptive enterocytes from the ileum and colon, chol-
angiocytes, myocardial cells, kidney proximal tubule cells, and bladder 
urothelial cells (Xu et al., 2020b; Zhang et al., 2020). These observations 
revealed that the organs with high ACE2-expressing cells would be 
regarded as those with high potential risk for SARS-CoV-2 contamina-
tion (Xu et al., 2020b). Xu et al. modelled the spike protein of the re-
ceptor for SARS-CoV-2 and found that ACE2 might be the receptor for 
this viral strain (Xu et al., 2020b). Likewise, ACE2 is a receptor for 
SARS-nCoV and NL63 (Cao et al., 2020). Based on their model, the 
coupling strength is greater between SARS-CoV-2 and ACE2 than the 
limit needed for viral contamination, though it is poorer than that be-
tween SARS-nCoV and ACE2. Zhou et al. carried out viral contamination 
assays and detected that ACE2 would be necessary for entering SAR-
S-CoV-2 into HeLa cells (Zhao et al., 2020). Such information demon-
strate that ACE2 may be the receptor for SARS-CoV-2. Zhao et al. 
examined normal lung tissue cells of eight healthy persons and noticed 
that the only Asian donor presented over five times the ACE2 expressing 
cell ratio as white and African American donors. These findings suggest 
that the Asian population is likely to be increasingly susceptible, though 
such a conclusion requires further documentation. Hao Xu et al. (2020b) 
presented evidence of ACE2 expression on the mucosa of the oral cavity. 
It is interesting that this receptor contained a high bulk of epithelial cells 
of the tongue, which have justified the basic mode of action by which the 
oral cavity has the potential of a high risk for SARS-CoV-2 contamination 
sensitivity; such discoveries also present proof of forthcoming prevent-
ing policies in dental clinical practice (Peng et al., 2020b) and everyday 
life. The observations also imply that ACE2 has a significant contribu-
tion to cellular entrance(Choi et al., 2020); hence, ACE2-expressing cells 
can serve as target cells, and have susceptibility to SARS-CoV-2 
contamination. It may be the SARS-COV-2 virus uses the ACE2 receptor 
to improvement access the cell interior that the virus can do replication 
there easily(Li et al., 2020). 
4. Conclusion 
The accessible data about environmental spread paths for SARS-CoV- 
2 that have not been earlier investigated to date were reviewed here, 
indicating the availability of scarce or unavailable documentation con-
cerning thereof. Despite the unconfirmed contagion of SARS-CoV-2 via 
drinking water, sewer systems, and ambient air revealed by accessible 
guidelines, reviewed data strengthen the suspicion by highlighting the 
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robust potential of environmental spread via these paths hence neces-
sitating extra studies. Moreover, the ACE2 that was recognised as a 
cellular doorway for SARS-CoV-2 entrance the cells by some studies, which 
may be useable for identifying novel paths of SARS-CoV-2 contagion. 
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